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The Deconstruction of Landowner Liability in 
Missouri: Errant Interpretations of Matteuzzi v. 
Columbus Partnership1 
John H. Bornhofen 
INTRODUCTION 
In Missouri, the circumstances under which a landowner2 is liable 
for injuries suffered by an independent contractor’s3 employee while 
working on the landowner’s land appear to be settled. The state 
appellate courts agree that a landowner is liable if: (1) the work is 
inherently dangerous4 and the contractor’s employee is ineligible for 
workers’ compensation,5 or (2) the landowner controls either the 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law, 2003. 
 1.  866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993). 
 2. This Note uses the pronoun “it” to refer to the landowner because the landowner is a 
business entity in every case considered herein. 
 3. Missouri has no statutory definition of the term “independent contractor.” In Vaseleou 
v. St. Louis Realty & Securities Co., the Missouri Supreme Court defined an independent 
contractor as “one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work 
according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to 
the result of his work.” 130 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Mo. 1939).  
 The following are among the factors that Missouri courts consider to determine whether a 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor: the extent of control that the party 
ordering the work may or does exercise over the details of the work, whether the work requires 
special training, the length of employment, the ordering party’s right to discharge the worker, 
the method of payment, who supplies tools, whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the party ordering the work, and whether the party ordering the work has a right to hire others to 
assist the worker and to direct assistants in their work. Handley v. State, Division of 
Employment Sec., 387 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). 
 4. In Salmon v. Kansas City, the Missouri Supreme Court defined an inherently 
dangerous activity as one that is “dangerous to others, no matter how carefully performed, 
where the danger arises from the act itself and not from the manner in which it is done.” 145 
S.W. 16, 23 (Mo. 1912) (en banc). 
 5. Bowles v. Weld Tire & Wheel, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Wilson v. 
River Market Venture, I, 996 S.W.2d 687, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Lawrence v. 
Bainbridge Apartments, 957 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).   
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employee’s physical activities or “the details of the manner in which 
the work is done.”6 Conversely stated, a landowner that controls 
neither the physical activities of the contractor’s employees nor the 
details of how they perform the work is not liable under any 
negligence theory for injury to an employee covered by workers’ 
compensation.7 The courts of appeals invariably cite the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s most recent examination of the issue in Matteuzzi v. 
Columbus Partnership as precedent for these landowner liability 
rules.8 
This Note argues that the prevailing interpretation of Matteuzzi is 
in error. The courts of appeals currently apply a test designed for 
analyzing premises liability in construction work cases (the “control-
of-the-work-test”)9 to cases that do not involve construction work. 
Consequently, post-Matteuzzi appellate court decisions base 
landowner liability on the landowner’s degree of control over the 
plaintiff’s work, even when the plaintiff’s injury is due to a condition 
of the premises that is unrelated to the work.10 This practice is 
 
 6. Smart v. Chrysler Corp., 991 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). See also Coonrod 
v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 984 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Callahan v. 
Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & 
Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments, 
919 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Horner v. Hammons, 916 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 7. Callahan, 973 S.W.2d at 490-91.  
 8. 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). Matteuzzi is not the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
latest holding on the issue. Later on the same day that it decided Matteuzzi, the court applied the 
rule from that case to a similar set of facts in Owens v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 
866 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1993). However, the court omitted the bulk of the Matteuzzi analysis 
from Owens. 
 9. According to this test, a landowner is liable for injuries suffered by a contractor’s 
employee if the employee can demonstrate that the landowner controlled the employee’s 
physical activities or the details of the manner in which the employee performed the work. See 
Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments, 957 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Most courts 
refer to the test as some variation of “control test,” or simply state the rule. See, e.g., Callahan v. 
Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (referring to the “control 
test”); Coonrod v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 984 S.W.2d 529, 533-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(stating the rule); Horner v. Hammons, 916 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to 
the “degree of control test”). James A. Burt refers to the “control of the work test” in his article, 
Landowner Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors: A Graphic Restatement. 53 J. 
MO. B. 86, 91 (1997). This term is adopted in this Note because it best describes the nature of 
the test.  
 10. As of February 2003, only one court of appeals case, Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc., 
has used the control-of-the-work test to evaluate an injury unrelated to the work. 973 S.W.2d 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/8
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unrealistic and unjust; it fails to ask which party is better able to avert 
the plaintiff’s injury, and it does nothing to prevent the recurrence of 
such injuries.  
Part I of this Note focuses on the principal theory of landowner 
liability to employees of independent contractors, known as premises 
liability,11 and the development of the test that often governs that 
theory,12 the control-of-the-work test. Part II examines the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s treatment of another landowner liability theory, the 
inherently dangerous activity doctrine,13 in Zueck v. Oppenheimer 
Gateway Properties, Inc.14 In this forerunner to Matteuzzi, the court 
identified the considerations relevant to evaluating landowner 
liability to employees of independent contractors. Part III analyzes 
Matteuzzi, wherein the Missouri Supreme Court both adopted the 
control-of-the-work-test and virtually eliminated the inherently 
dangerous activity doctrine as a cause of action for employees of 
independent contractors. Part IV reviews the subsequent case law in 
the appellate courts involving claims by contractors’ employees 
against landowners. Part V explains how these appellate court 
decisions have distorted Matteuzzi and how the resulting precedent 
can create unrealistic and unjust results. Finally, Part VI offers the 
appropriate statement of the law after Matteuzzi. It explains 
Matteuzzi’s advantages over the prevailing view, using the 
 
488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Language in other cases, however, makes it clear that there is no 
other accepted means to evaluate landowner liability to employees of independent contractors 
who are covered by workers’ compensation. See, e.g., Coonrod v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 
984 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (a landowner has no duty of care to the plaintiff 
unless the landowner exercises substantial control over the work); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (the only relevant query in such cases is 
whether the landowner’s involvement in the work was sufficient to impose liability). 
 11. This Note uses term “premises liability” to refer to the general duty of a landowner to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to the employee of an independent contractor while 
on the land. More specific versions of this duty are detailed at sections 343 and 422 of the 
Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 422 (1965). These sections are 
reproduced at notes 35 and 113, infra. Recent appellate court decisions have denied the viability 
of premises liability claims by employees of independent contractors who are covered by 
workers’ compensation. See, e.g., Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998); Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).  
 12. This Note challenges the post-Matteuzzi appellate court decisions that maintain that 
the test governs every instance of such liability. 
 13.  See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 14. 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991). 
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considerations that the Missouri Supreme Court announced in Zueck 
as a guide. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROL-OF-THE-WORK TEST 
According to the control-of-the-work test, a landowner is not 
liable for injuries suffered during a period of construction by a 
contractor’s employee who is covered by workers’ compensation, 
unless the landowner controls the employee’s physical activities or 
the details of the manner in which the employee performs the work.15  
A. Early Struggles with the Control Issue 
Although the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the control-of-the-
work test fairly recently,16 the question of control has long been at the 
center of cases involving injuries to employees of independent 
contractors.17 Such cases present a peculiar problem by bringing two 
generally accepted rules into conflict with each other. The first 
general rule states that a landowner has a duty to use reasonable and 
ordinary care to prevent injury to invitees,18 a category that includes 
employees of independent contractors.19 This rule describes a kind of 
premises liability.20 The second general rule states that the duty of 
furnishing a reasonably safe workplace for an employee rests with the 
employer.21 The two rules conflict as to which party—the landowner 
or the employer—bears liability for the plaintiff’s injuries when the 
employer is a contractor who does not own the workplace.22  
 
 15. 866 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1993) (citing Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, Inc., 
832 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)). If the worker’s employer is not liable for workers’ 
compensation insurance, the worker may still state a claim under the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine. The worker may thus circumvent the control-of-the-work test. Lawrence v. 
Bainbridge Apartments, 957 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 16. The court adopted the test in Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128 
(Mo. 1993) (citing Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 929). 
 17. Control is also the decisive element in discerning independent contractors from 
statutory employees. See supra note 3. 
 18. Glaser v. Rothschild, 120 S.W. 1, 3 (Mo. 1909). 
 19. Enloe v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 427 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Mo. 1968). 
 20. Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 21. Herdler v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 37 S.W. 115, 118 (Mo. 1896).  
 22. Normally, when the plaintiff sues both the landowner and the contractor, the 
landowner argues one rule and the contractor argues the other. See, e.g., Clark v. Union Iron & 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/8
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Early Missouri Supreme Court efforts to reconcile this conflict 
employed fact-specific analyses. These decisions provide a useful 
history of the court’s struggle with the question of control. 
1. The Landowner’s Duty  
In Ryan v. St. Louis Transit Co.,23 the court emphasized the 
landowner’s duty to an employee of an independent contractor. The 
plaintiff was a pipe fitter.24 The defendant, an electric company and 
operator of streetcars, had hired the plaintiff’s employer to install 
water pipes in the basement of its powerhouse.25 The plaintiff died 
from electrocution when one of the pipes he was working with 
touched a poorly insulated electrical cable that was hanging from the 
ceiling.26  
The court made four observations. First, the insulation on the 
cables was not the proper kind to use in such a location.27 Second, if 
the proper type of insulation had been used, the injury would not 
have occurred.28 Third, the dangerous condition of the pipes was not 
obvious upon sight.29 Finally, the court found that the plaintiff acted 
with reasonable care in performing his work.30  
Based on these findings, the court found the landowner liable for 
the plaintiff’s injuries.31 The court held that the landowner was bound 
to anticipate that the plaintiff would touch one of the cables during 
the course of his work.32 The landowner’s lack of control over the 
 
Foundry Co., 137 S.W. 577, 579, 583 (Mo. 1911); Jewell v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 132 
S.W. 703, 704, 706-07 (Mo. 1910). While it is true that more than one party can bear liability in 
many circumstances, the apparent conflict between the two rules fueled the push for a rule 
offering greater predictability.  
 23. 89 S.W. 865 (Mo. 1905). 
 24. Id. at 865. 
 25. Id. at 866. 
 26. Id. at 867. 
 27. Id. The insulation was “of a kind to be easily affected by the extraordinary 
temperature to which the transit company knowingly and continually subjected” the cables. Id. 
at 868. 
 28. Id. at 868. 
 29. Id. at 867. “[A] reasonable man would have felt that he could safely undertake to work 
in their vicinity.” Id. at 869. 
 30. Id. at 869. 
 31. Id. at 868. 
 32. “[K]nowledge of the character of the insulation installed by itself, of the conditions 
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plaintiff did not negate its duty to exercise reasonable care to make 
the premises reasonably safe for the plaintiff’s work.33 Further, 
although the plaintiff and a fellow employee were the only people in 
the basement, the room was under the landowner’s “exclusive 
control.”34  
The principles on which the Ryan court relied later appeared in 
section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets forth 
landowner liability to invitees.35 
2. The Contractor’s Duty 
Clark v. Union Iron & Foundry Co. provides a good contrast to 
Ryan.36 The court emphasized the employer’s duty to provide a safe 
workplace for the employee.37 The plaintiff, a laborer, had recovered 
from the landowner in a previous action,38 and brought this action 
against his employer. The landowner, a railway company, hired the 
plaintiff’s employer to erect a coal chute on its premises.39 The 
 
under which it was maintained, and of the probable effect of those conditions on the safety of 
the insulation, must be chargeable to the defendant company.” Id. 
 33. Id. at 869.  
 34. Id. at 868. 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he 
 (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
 (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it, and 
 (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
 36. 137 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1911). 
 37. Id. at 581-82. 
 38. Id. at 580-81. About the landowner’s duty, the court said: 
[W]hen the railway company made the contract with [the contractor], by implication it 
agreed that [the contractor and its employees] might go upon its premises and do all 
things that were necessary to accomplish that purpose. And the law imposed the duty 
on the railway company to use no dangerous agencies in or about the premises that 
would injure or kill such employes while so engaged within the scope of their 
employment. 
Id. at 582. 
 39. Id. at 578. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/8
p145 note Bornhofen book pages.doc  4/10/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Deconstruction of Landowner Liability in MO 151 
 
 
employer maintained a foreman on the premises to oversee the 
work.40 There was a pole in the area, to which several electrical wires 
were attached.41 During the course of the work, the employer’s 
foreman ordered the plaintiff to climb the pole and connect a support 
cable for the coal chute.42 The plaintiff was injured when he touched 
an electrical wire that was poorly insulated.43 
Based on these facts, the court found the contractor liable for the 
employee’s injuries.44 In response to the contractor’s argument that it 
had no more opportunity than the plaintiff to discover the dangerous 
condition, the court held that the contractor had a duty to inspect the 
premises and warn the employee of any hidden dangers that were 
reasonably discoverable.45 By ordering the plaintiff to climb the pole, 
the foreman gave the contractor’s assurance that the pole was safe to 
climb.46  
B. A Test for Cases Involving Construction Work 
An early version of the control-of-the-work test debuted in Hunt v. 
Jefferson Arms Apartment Co.,47 a 1984 appellate court decision. In 
Hunt, the plaintiff fell down an elevator shaft while working on a 
hotel renovation project.48 The contractor maintained physical control 
of the building,49 and no employee of the landowner was involved in 
the plaintiff’s accident.50 In fact, one of the plaintiff’s fellow 
employees had moved the elevator cab to another floor without 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 579. The plaintiff received a “terrific shock” so that he became a “helpless 
cripple for life.” Id. at 580. 
 44. Id. at 582. 
 45. Id. at 583. This assertion, the court said, “is but another way of stating the rule that the 
master must use reasonable care to furnish a reasonably safe place for his servants to work.” Id. 
at 582. 
 46. Id. at 581. 
 47. 679 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 48. Id. at 878. As part of his job, the plaintiff transported debris on a motor buggy from 
upper floors to a dumpster located outside of the building. Assuming that the elevator cab was 
on his floor, the plaintiff drove through open elevator doors into an empty shaft. Id. 
 49. Id. at 880. 
 50. Id. at 881. 
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closing the elevator doors.51  
Despite such circumstances, the plaintiff won a sizable jury 
verdict against the landowner in trial court, arguing landowner 
liability to invitees.52 The court of appeals responded by adopting a 
rule intended to make construction cases more predictable. Citing an 
Iowa Supreme Court decision, the court held that a landowner’s duty 
of care to the employee of an independent contractor ceases when the 
landowner surrenders control of the premises to the contractor during 
a period of construction.53 The landowner cannot be held liable for 
injuries suffered during construction on the premises unless the 
landowner “substantially” supervised the construction.54 The court 
further stated that contract provisions offer little guidance as to which 
party has factual control of the premises.55  
A later appeals court decision, Halmick v. SBC Corporate 
Services, Inc.,56 added the final elements to the control-of-the-work 
test by specifying the level of landowner control that qualified as 
“substantial.” As in Hunt, the plaintiff in Halmick suffered his 
injuries while working on a construction project.57 After applying the 
Hunt test, the court stated that a landowner retains liability if it 
controls the employees’ physical activities or the “details of the 
manner in which” the employees perform the work.58 
 
 51. Id. at 878. 
 52. Id. at 877. The trial court awarded $1,300,000. Id. 
 53. Id. at 880 (citing Lunde v. Wennebago Industries, Inc., 299 N.W.2d 473, 479 (Iowa 
1980)). A landowner that surrenders “control and possession of the premises to an independent 
contractor during a period of construction . . . is not the possessor of the land during the 
construction period.” Id. 
 54.  “The owner’s involvement in overseeing the construction must be substantial in order 
to justify imposition of liability on the owner.” 679 S.W.2d at 880. 
 55. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E, cmt. a (1965)). Contract 
provisions “merely set forth legal relationships between the various contracting parties.” Id. at 
880. The court also cited the comment’s statement that possession within the context of a 
landowner’s liability for injuries occurring on the premises is used “strictly in the factual 
sense.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E, cmt. a (1965)). Interestingly, the 
Hunt court quoted the statement regarding factual control just before adopting an early form of 
the control-of-the-work test. Id. at 880. While the test helped the court determine factual 
possession during the hotel renovation project, the test later enabled courts to ignore factual 
control in cases such as Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
and Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).  
 56. 832 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 57. Id. at 927. 
 58. Id. at 929 (citing Williamson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 265 S.W.2d 354, 359 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/8
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II. ZUECK AND THE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY DOCTRINE59 
Missouri’s inherently dangerous activity doctrine holds a 
landowner liable for injuries to third parties or employees of 
independent contractors not covered by workers’ compensation. The 
doctrine predicates liability on the landowner’s failure to take 
precautions to prevent an injury caused by an inherently dangerous 
activity performed on the land.60 Because workers’ compensation 
 
(Mo. 1954); Boulch v. John B. Gutmann Construction Co., 366 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1963)). The cases cited by the court dealt with third-party injury claims against companies for 
the negligence of independent contractors working for those companies.  
 59. The history of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine in Missouri is well 
documented. See Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993) (containing 
an extensive analysis of the doctrine by the Missouri Supreme Court); Zueck v. Oppenheimer 
Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991) (containing another thorough analysis by the 
Missouri Supreme Court); Burt, supra note 9 (addressing the status of the doctrine after 
Matteuzzi and critiquing the Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning in Zueck); Carol J. Miller, 
Inherently Dangerous Exception Versus Worker’s Compensation, 48 J. MO. B. 212 (1992) 
(recounting the history of the doctrine and assessing its status in the aftermath of Zueck); 
Matthew A. Clement, Missouri Slams the Door on Employees of Independent Contractors, 59 
MO. L. REV. 1037 (1994) (examining the doctrine’s history and agreeing with the then recent 
Matteuzzi holding); Nancy L. Ripperger, The Inherently Dangerous Doctrine in Missouri: A 
Socially Just Doctrine?, 56 MO. L. REV. 479 (1991) (examining the doctrine’s development 
and advocating the approach that the Missouri Supreme Court would soon adopt in Zueck). 
 60. Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments, 957 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The 
doctrine originally served as an exception to the general common law rule that a landowner is 
not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a contractor’s employee. W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509, 512 (5th ed. 1984). The general 
rule served the rationale that the contractor, as the person in immediate control of the employee, 
should bear the burden of liability for the employee’s actions. Id at 509. “[The work] is to be 
regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than the [landowner], is the proper 
party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk, and administering and 
distributing it.” Id. This rule proved unsatisfactory, however, where a landowner contracts for 
work that is likely to cause injury or damage to persons or property bordering the land without 
the taking of special precautions. Landowners could order the dangerous work and avoid 
liability for any resulting harm simply by contracting out. In Bower v. Peate, the court 
addressed the problem by stating that a landowner is liable for the negligence of the contractor 
or the contractor’s employees if the landowner contracts for work that poses hazards to the 
surrounding area without taking special precautions. 1 Q.B.D. 321, 326 (1876). A landowner:  
who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, 
injurious consequences to his neighbor must be expected to arise, unless means are 
adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of 
that which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his 
responsibility by employing someone else . . . to do what is necessary to prevent the 
act he has ordered to be done from becoming wrongful. 
Id. Although Keeton indicates that Bower established the inherently dangerous activity doctrine 
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p145 note Bornhofen book pages.doc 4/10/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 12:145 
 
 
covers the vast majority of contractors whose employees perform 
inherently dangerous activities, the doctrine is now largely defunct as 
a cause of action for employees of independent contractors.61  
In contrast, the courts did not consider workers’ compensation 
when judging claims under the doctrine before 1991.62 In that year, 
however, the Missouri Supreme Court decided Zueck v. Oppenheimer 
Gateway Properties, Inc.63 In Zueck, the court eliminated vicarious 
liability claims under the doctrine for plaintiffs covered by workers’ 
compensation.64 The court presented at least seven identifiable 
justifications for its holding. 
 
(see KEETON § 71, at 512), the Missouri Supreme Court not only invoked a theory similar to the 
doctrine in 1874, but also applied that theory to find a landowner liable to a contractor’s 
employee. See Horner v. Nicholson, 56 Mo. 220, 221 (Mo. 1874). 
 61. All employers in the construction industry, where inherently dangerous activities most 
often take place, must carry workers’ compensation insurance. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030 
(1994). In other industries, every employer with five or more employees must carry the 
insurance. Id. § 287.030(3); Miller, supra note 59, at 220. 
 62. The doctrine was generally available to employees of independent contractors, 
regardless of workers’ compensation coverage, for over sixty years. The Missouri Supreme 
Court officially recognized the cause of action for such plaintiffs in Mallory v. Louisiana Pure 
Ice & Supply Co., 320 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1928) (en banc). 
 63. 809 S.W.2d 384 (1991). 
 64. Id. at 390. The court held that “the inherently dangerous exception no longer applies 
to employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation . . . .” Id. The 
plaintiff had advanced only a vicarious liability theory, however, and comments in the chief 
justice’s concurring opinion led to some speculation that a cause of action survived where the 
landowner was directly negligent under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. Id. at 391 
(Blackmar, C.J., concurring). The chief justice stated that there may still be an inherently 
dangerous activity cause of action in “a case in which the evidence supports a finding of a duty 
from the owner to others and a breach of that duty through the owner’s own negligence.” See 
Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, 832 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) 
(acknowledging the chief justice’s remarks as the basis for the plaintiff’s claim); Matteuzzi v. 
Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Mo. 1993) (comparing the vicarious and 
direct negligence versions of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine in response to the 
plaintiff’s claim of direct negligence under the doctrine). 
 Vicarious liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine is set forth in section 
416 of the Restatement. That section, titled “Work Dangerous in Absence of Special 
Precautions,” states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to 
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the 
contract or otherwise. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965). 
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First, workers’ compensation provides the plaintiff with a source 
of recovery, obviating the need for the landowner to insure against 
the employee’s injuries.65 Second, because the contractor’s workers’ 
compensation costs are included in the contract amount, the 
landowner has already paid for the employee’s insurance and should 
not have to bear any further liability.66 Third, the doctrine defeats the 
tort policy goal of placing the burden of liability on the party who can 
best avoid the harm.67 The experienced independent contractor, not 
the landowner, should bear liability because the contractor is better 
able to identify an activity’s inherent dangers and prevent them from 
causing injury.68 Fourth, the doctrine encourages the landowner to 
avoid liability by using its own employees to perform dangerous 
work that a skilled contractor could better handle, thereby increasing 
the risk of injury to workers.69 Fifth, by encouraging the use of 
statutory employees to perform the work, the doctrine increases risk 
to third parties who are not participating in the work.70 Sixth, the 
contractor’s own negligence often causes injuries incurred during the 
course of dangerous work. Thus, inherently dangerous activity claims 
defeat the tort policy goal of placing the loss upon the party who is at 
fault.71 Finally, Missouri’s workers’ compensation law releases the 
 
 65. 809 S.W.2d at 388, 389. “The employees of the independent contractor are protected 
by workers’ compensation.” Id. at 388. 
 66. Id. at 389. The court later called this situation “double liability” in Matteuzzi. 
Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. 1993). See Peone v. Regulus 
Stud Mills, Inc., 744 P.2d 102, 113 (Idaho 1987) (Bistline, J., dissenting) for criticism of this 
justification from another jurisdiction. 
 67. 809 S.W. 2d at 388 (quoting W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 6 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 68. 809 S.W.2d at 387-88. 
 69. Id. at 388. 
 70. Id. The court favored the continued availability of the doctrine to third parties, such as 
pedestrians: 
Common sense permits a landowner to identify the potential harm which an activity 
may create to persons not participating in the activity. Having identified the risks, a 
responsible landowner may undertake the steps necessary to protect third parties from 
that harm. The need to deny access to a facility, erect protective barricades around 
excavations, construct protective overheads where work aloft is anticipated, and a 
myriad of obviously needed and easily fabricated devices are relatively easy to 
anticipate and provide. 
Id. at 387.  
 71. Id. at 390. The court emphasizes this point: “The purpose of the law of torts is to . . . 
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employer from all further liability for an employee’s injury.72 A 
faultless landowner thus has no recourse against a contractor whose 
negligence causes the injury.73 
III. THE MATTEUZZI DECISION 
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine and applied the control-of-the-work test in the same 
case for the first time in Matteuzzi.74 The court held that (1) an 
employee of an independent contractor covered by workers’ 
compensation cannot bring any form of inherently dangerous activity 
claim against a landowner;75 and (2) during a period of construction, 
an employee of an independent contractor must show that the 
landowner controlled either the employee’s physical activities or the 
“details of the manner in which” the employee performed the work in 
order to prove that the landowner retained liability for the plaintiff’s 
injuries.76  
 
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as a result of the [negligent] conduct 
of another.” Id. at 388 (quoting W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 
(5th ed. 1984)). 
 72. 809 S.W.2d at 388-89 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (1986)). The statute reads, 
“[e]very employer subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . shall be released from all other 
liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person.” MO. REV. STAT. § 
287.120 (1986). In McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting, the Missouri 
Supreme Court held:  
[T]he language of Sec. 287.120(1), ‘shall be released from all other liability therefor 
whatsoever,’ means all other liability ‘for personal injury or death of the employee’; 
and does not mean liability for breach of an independent duty or obligation owed to a 
third party by an employer whose liability for injury to his employee is under the 
compensation act. It seems unlikely that workmen’s compensation acts were intended 
to affect the rights of third parties outside of the employer-employee relationship. 
323 S.W.2d 788, 796 (Mo. 1959). This observation is in direct conflict with the court’s 
subsequent dictum in Zueck, that landowners have no right to be indemnified by negligent 
contractors. See 809 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. 1991). 
 73. 809 S.W.2d at 388-89. For criticism of the court’s reasoning on this issue, see Burt, 
supra note 9, at 89-90, noting that landowners can ensure indemnification by specifying the 
right in the work contract (citing McDonnell, 323 S.W.2d at 796). 
 74. 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993). 
 75. Id. at 132. 
 76. Id. (citing Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1992)). The plaintiff was replacing the roof of a row house that was undergoing extensive 
renovation. Id. The work required the plaintiff to position himself on the roof, which was 
supported only by a deteriorated brick wall. The plaintiff was injured when the wall collapsed. 
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The plaintiff in Matteuzzi argued that the landowner was directly 
negligent in failing to take the proper precautions to minimize the 
risk of injury posed by an inherently dangerous activity.77 According 
to the plaintiff, this direct liability form of the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine remained viable after Zueck.78 
The court considered whether its earlier reasoning in Zueck, for 
eliminating vicarious landowner liability, also applied to claims 
alleging the landowner’s own negligence.79 The court focused on two 
justifications in the Zueck holding: the unfairness of imposing two 
forms of liability—for workers’ compensation and for inherently 
dangerous activities—on the landowner, and the increased risk of 
injury that results when the landowner opts to use statutory 
employees to do the work instead of experienced independent 
contractors.80 The court concluded that these reasons apply to either 
version of the doctrine, and rejected the plaintiff’s argument.81 
Having dispensed with the inherently dangerous activity issue, the 
court next considered whether the plaintiff might have a premises 
liability cause of action.82 The plaintiff claimed that the landowner 
breached its duty to provide a safe workplace.83 The court noted the 
general rule of landowner liability to employees of independent 
 
He later filed a claim for workers’ compensation with his employer as well as a separate claim 
for damages against the landowner. Id. 
 77. The plaintiff’s theory is set forth in section 413 of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). That section, titled “Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions 
Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to Contractor,” states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer (a) 
fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or (b) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. 
Id. 
 78. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131. 
 79. Id. at 130-32. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text for the details of the 
court’s analysis in Zueck. 
 80. 866 S.W.2d at 131-32. 
 81. Id. “The same reasons set forth in Zueck for rejecting a claim under section 416 are 
equally persuasive to reject a claim under section 413.” Id. at 131.  
 82. Id. at 132.  
 83. Id. 
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contractors.84 Where the landowner “relinquishes possession and 
control of the premises to an independent contractor during a period 
of construction,” however, the general rule no longer applies. In such 
situations, the court announced, the control-of-the-work test applies. 
The court found that the landowner exercised too little control to be 
liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.85 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREVAILING INTERPRETATION OF 
MATTEUZZI 
A. Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments: The Court Applies the 
Control-of-the-Work Test to Non-Construction Situations 
The Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri decided 
Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments86 three years after the Matteuzzi 
decision. Together with two later appellate court cases, Lawrence 
shaped the prevailing view of Matteuzzi.87 In Lawrence, the court 
applied the control-of-the-work test to a window washer’s claim 
against the owner of an apartment complex,88 making Lawrence the 
first case to apply the test in a non-construction situation.  
The plaintiff in Lawrence was injured in a fall while cleaning the 
upper level windows of an apartment building.89 After filing a claim 
for workers’ compensation benefits against the company employing 
him for the job, he brought a negligence claim against the landowner 
alleging premises liability based on control.90 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. 919 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 87. The two other cases are Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998), and Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 88. 919 S.W.2d at 569-70. 
 89. Id. at 568.  
 90. Id. at 567-68. The plaintiff also invoked the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. Id. 
Whether the company, Smart Way Janitorial Service, was the plaintiff’s employer for workers’ 
compensation purposes was a matter of dispute in the workers’ compensation proceedings. Id. 
at 571-72. The court noted the holding of Scott v. Edwards Transportation Co., that abrogation 
of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine applies only where an independent contractor is 
“liable” to a plaintiff employee for his injuries pursuant to the workers’ compensation law. Id. 
at 571 (citing Scott v. Edwards Transp. Co., 889 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)). Although 
an administrative law judge had awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff, the 
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To determine whether the landowner retained such control, the 
court looked to Owens v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.91 The 
Missouri Supreme Court decided Owens on the same day as 
Matteuzzi, using identical legal principles.92 The plaintiff in Owens 
slipped and fell from scaffolding while painting the ceiling of a 
building that was under construction.93 The landowner had insisted 
that the plaintiff use a certain color of paint, even though that color 
was unavailable in the non-slip variety that the plaintiff preferred.94 
Similarly, the landowner in Lawrence insisted that the plaintiff wash 
the apartment building windows from the outside, even though the 
buildings lacked adequate structures to which the plaintiff could tie 
his safety line.95 As in Owens, the Lawrence court found that the 
plaintiff could not satisfy the control-of-the-work test.96 The plaintiff 
was free to do the work as he chose, so long as he did so from the 
outside of the building.97 
 
Appeals Board for the Kansas Division of Workers’ Compensation later set aside the award on 
appeal. Id. at 568. The issue was whether the plaintiff was in fact an employee of a contractor. 
Id. Because the plaintiff’s appeal of the second ruling was pending when the court entered its 
holding in Lawrence, the court remanded the case. The appeals board ordered the trial court to 
reinstate the inherently dangerous activity claim on remand if it found that the plaintiff was not 
a covered employee under workers’ compensation. Id. at 572. On remand, the trial court found 
that the plaintiff was not an employee, but a solo independent contractor. Lawrence v. 
Bainbridge Apartments, 957 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The plaintiff, therefore, did 
not qualify as an employee under the workers’ compensation statute, and was ineligible for 
benefits. Id. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030(1) (1993). The court held that such a worker could 
not recover for injuries under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. 957 S.W.2d at 405. 
The court reasoned that, as an independent contractor, the plaintiff enjoyed stronger bargaining 
power than an employee would, as well as the freedom to accept or decline an offer based on 
his assessment of the risk involved. Id. 
 91. 866 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1993). 
 92. The Missouri Supreme Court applied the same new rules regarding the inherently 
dangerous activity doctrine and premises liability in both cases. Id. at 134-35. While the court 
decided Matteuzzi first, and presented its reasoning for the new rules more thoroughly there 
than in Owens, the Lawrence court found the fact pattern it faced more analogous to Owens 
than to Matteuzzi. 919 S.W.2d at 569. 
 93. 866 S.W.2d at 134. 
 94. Id. at 134-35. The oil paint became slippery when enough of it accumulated on the 
scaffolding. Id. at 133. 
 95. 919 S.W.2d at 568. The landowner believed that washing the windows from the 
outside of the buildings, rather than from the inside, would be less intrusive to the tenants. 
 96. Id. at 570. 
 97. Id. This echoed the holding in Owens, where the court called the choice of paint color 
“wholly different from the activity of painting.” 866 S.W.2d at 135. 
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B. Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co.: The Court Applies the 
Control-of-the-Work Test to Section 343 Claims98 
In 1996, the same court that produced the Lawrence opinion 
decided Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co.99 Gillespie, 
another non-construction case, held that Matteuzzi’s control-of-the-
work test governs landowner liability to invitees as outlined in 
section 343 of the Restatement.100 The plaintiff in Gillespie was 
installing computer cable atop two elevated structural beams in a 
functioning power facility.101 Thick dust and insulation covered a gap 
between the two beams, causing the plaintiff to mistake them for one 
solid beam.102 The plaintiff, who was not wearing a safety belt, fell 
when his foot broke through the insulation covering the gap.103  
The plaintiff invoked the premises liability theory found in section 
343 of the Restatement.104 He noted that the Missouri Supreme Court 
had previously applied this theory to claims like his,105 and that Zueck 
and Matteuzzi rejected only the inherently dangerous activity doctrine 
set out in sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement.106 Conceding that 
neither Zueck nor Matteuzzi mentioned section 343, the court 
nevertheless found that both cases implicitly included the section by 
noting the general rule of landowner liability to invitees.107 The court 
also stated that by abrogating direct liability under section 413, the 
Matteuzzi court “necessarily balanced the type of policy concerns” 
 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
 99. 937 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 100. Id. at 378-79. 
 101. Id. at 374. 
 102. Id. at 374-75.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 377-78.  
 105. Id. at 378. The plaintiff cited Hokanson v. Joplin Rendering Co., Inc. for this claim. 
509 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1974). In Hokanson, the court analyzed an employee of an independent 
contractor’s claim by referring to section 343. Id. at 110. The plaintiff claimed that the feet of 
the ladder the landowner supplied for the plaintiff’s work were greasy. Id. The court found that 
the dangerous condition that caused the injury was open and obvious, and that the landowner 
was therefore not liable. Id. at 113-14. Like the cases discussed in Part I, Hokanson is an 
example of a properly analyzed landowner liability case.  
 106. 937 S.W.2d at 378. These portions of the Restatement are reproduced at notes 64 and 
77, supra. 
 107. Id. at 378-79. 
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that would factor into the decision to disallow claims under section 
343.108 Accordingly, the court ruled that the control-of-the-work test 
applies to section 343 claims.109  
C. Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc.: The Court Applies the Control-of-
the-Work Test to Section 343 Claims Where the Cause of Injury Is 
Unrelated to the Work 
The most recent noteworthy interpretation of Matteuzzi is found in 
Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc.110 Callahan, like Lawrence and 
Gillespie, dealt with a non-construction situation. But unlike its 
predecessors, Callahan dealt with an injury that did not spring from 
the plaintiff’s work activity.111 Even in such circumstances, Callahan 
held, a plaintiff must satisfy the control-of-the-work test. 
The plaintiff in Callahan argued that because his case was 
distinguishable from Halmick, he could proceed under section 343112 
as well as section 422.113 The plaintiff distinguished his case from 
 
 108. Id. at 378. 
 109. Id. at 379.  
 110. 973 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 111. Id. at 490. The plaintiff, an employee of an independent plumbing contractor, was 
installing water piping in a running manufacturing plant. Id. at 489; Appellant’s Brief at 38, 
Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc., 973 S.W. 2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (No. 72908). While 
performing this work, he was overcome by carbon monoxide fumes, and fell from his ladder. 
Callahan, 973 S.W.2d at 489. He sustained a neck injury requiring “cervical fusion surgery,” as 
well as memory loss due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Appellant’s Brief at 12, Callahan (No. 
72908). A pipe that carried exhaust fumes from a machine called a “chiller unit” or “oven” ran 
through the room. Id. at 10. Apparently, a plant employee had replaced a portion of the pipe 
with a rubber hose to alleviate a condensation problem in the exhaust system. Id. at 10-11. The 
hose became disconnected due to unknown causes, and instead of carrying the carbon 
monoxide out of the building, it released the fumes in the room. Id. at 11. Shortly before losing 
consciousness, the plaintiff noticed the rubber hose hanging down to the floor, where it looped 
in a circle. Id. at 10. The court deemed these details immaterial, saying, “whether or not the 
dangerous condition existed before plaintiff began working on defendant’s property is not 
relevant to our analysis.” 973 S.W.2d at 491. 
 112. Appellant’s Brief at 37, Callahan (No. 72908) (citing Halmick v. SBC Corporate 
Services, Inc., 832 S.W. 2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 113. Id. at 40-41. Section 422 of the Restatement, titled “Work on Buildings and Other 
Structures on Land,” states: 
A possessor of land who entrusts to an independent contractor construction, repair, or 
other work on the land, or on a building or other structure upon it, is subject to the 
same liability as though he  had retained the work in his own  hands to others on or  
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Halmick in two key ways. First, whereas the employee in Halmick 
was working on a construction project that was in the factual control 
of the contractor, the plaintiff’s injury occurred in a fully operational 
manufacturing plant.114 Second, whereas the employee’s injury in 
Halmick was a natural consequence of his work,115 the plaintiff’s 
injuries were due to a dangerous condition that preexisted his arrival 
on the premises.116 Therefore, the plaintiff argued, the landowner was 
in possession of the premises, and the plaintiff’s injuries were 
unrelated to his work. In such a situation, the control-of-the-work test 
should not apply.117 Instead, either section 343 or section 422, both 
 
outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the unsafe condition of the 
structure 
 (a) while the possessor has retained possession of the land during the progress of the 
work, or  
 (b) after he has resumed possession of the land upon its completion.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 (1965). Unlike section 343, section 422 specifically 
mentions independent contractors. Id. This Note focuses on section 343 as the main alternative 
to the current rule because the principles of landowner/invitee liability found in that section 
have a more extensive history in Missouri than do the ideas found in section 422. A search of 
Missouri case law on Westlaw and Lexis/Nexis returned only three mentions of section 422. 
The court briefly refers to the section in Matteuzzi to support the contention that the duty of care 
shifts from the landowner to the independent contractor when the landowner relinquishes 
control and possession of the premises to the contractor. 866 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1993). The 
only other mention of section 422, other than in Callahan, appears in Saggio v. City of Arnold, 
807 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). The section appears there only because the plaintiff 
called attention to it. Id. The court quickly dismissed the plaintiff’s point. Id. The adoption of 
either theory for claims by employees of independent contractors against landowners in non-
construction situations would be a major improvement over the control-of-the-work test.  
 114. 973 S.W.2d at 491; Appellant’s Brief at 39, Callahan (No. 72908). Although the court 
in Callahan never mentioned the word, “construction,” the plaintiff emphasized the 
construction/non-construction distinction in the Appellant’s Brief submitted to the court. Id. at 
39. The appellant’s brief also repeatedly asserted that the landowner must have factual control 
of the premises if the plant is operating fully during the work. Id. at 36, 38-40. Comment c. to 
section 422 of the Restatement strongly supports the plaintiff’s position. The comment states, 
“Possession usually is surrendered fully in the case of construction or demolition work, and it 
may be surrendered in cases of extensive repairs. Normally, however, the employer remains in 
possession during ordinary repairs, and for that reason the rule here stated is more frequently 
applied in such cases.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 cmt. c (1965).  
 115. 832 S.W.2d at 926-27. “As part of his duties, appellant was required to work on steel 
girders approximately 45 feet above the ground. While walking along one of these girders, 
appellant slipped on a ‘slick or slippery’ surface of the girder and fell to the ground.” Id. 
 116. See supra note 111. 
 117. 973 S.W.2d at 490-91. The control-of-the-work test applies when the “landowner 
relinquishes possession and control of the premises to an independent contractor during a period 
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containing premises liability theories, should govern the case.118 
These distinctions fell on deaf ears. The court rejoined each of the 
plaintiff’s arguments with the observation that Matteuzzi requires the 
plaintiff to satisfy the control-of-the-work test to bring a claim 
against the landowner under any negligence theory.119 The existence 
of a dangerous condition before the plaintiff began working, the court 
said, is irrelevant to the case.120 
V. POST-MATTEUZZI DECISIONS ANALYZED 
Each of the three court of appeals decisions discussed in Part IV 
expanded the Missouri Supreme Court’s Matteuzzi decision in a way 
that weakened the ability of employees of independent contractors to 
bring negligence claims against landowners. Critical examination of 
these holdings reveals legally suspect analyses that amount to bad 
policy. 
A. Lawrence v. Bainbridge Apartments 
As noted in Part IV, Lawrence was the first case to apply the 
control-of-the-work test in a non-construction case.121 It is easy to 
find where the Lawrence opinion goes astray. As the court recites the 
controlling case law, all from Matteuzzi, it begins detailing the 
control-of-the-work test. Included in the recitation is the phrase, 
“during the period of construction.”122 However, the court never 
again mentions those crucial words. One possible explanation for 
how the court overlooked the construction issue is that it was 
distracted by the similarities between the facts before it and those in 
Owens. In each case, the plaintiff worked at elevated heights without 
 
of construction.” Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1993). The 
plaintiff conceded that the landowner did not control his work. 973 S.W.2d at 491; Appellant’s 
Brief at 43, Callahan (No. 72908).  
 118. 973 S.W.2d at 490-91. 
 119. Id. The court even went so far as to say that the plaintiff must satisfy the test “to 
recover under any tort theory.” Id. at 490. 
 120. Id. at 491. “[W]hether or not the dangerous condition existed before plaintiff began 
working on defendant’s property is not relevant to our analysis.” 
 121. 919 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
 122. 919 S.W.2d at 569 (citing Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132). 
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taking the appropriate safety precautions. In each case, the 
landowner’s demands added risk to the work. In Owens, however, the 
plaintiff was painting the ceiling of a grocery store that was under 
construction.123 There was no construction activity in Lawrence. The 
control-of-the-work test was therefore appropriate for Owens, but not 
for Lawrence.   
Although Lawrence set bad precedent, the court reached the 
correct result. Employing a section 343 premises liability analysis, 
we see that the dangerous condition was the lack of “tie back” 
structures on the roof.124 This condition was obvious to the plaintiff 
well before it posed any danger to him. As a professional window 
washer, he knew the risk of proceeding without adequate support for 
a safety line. The landowner would therefore not be liable.125 
B. Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. 
Gillespie was the first case to hold that the control-of-the-work 
test governs premises liability claims under section 343 of the 
Restatement.126 The court cited Halmick127 and Matteuzzi128 as 
precedent for this holding.129 As in Lawrence, the court oddly ignored 
the construction work context of those cases.130 The court reasoned 
that Zueck implicitly included section 343 in its holding by noting the 
general rule of landowner liability to invitees.131 The court also found 
that Matteuzzi necessarily contemplated section 343 premises liability 
 
 123. 866 S.W.2d at 133. 
 124. Section 343, titled “Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor,” 
subjects the landowner to liability for harm caused to invitees by “a condition on the land.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (reproduced at note 35, supra). 
 125. Section 343(b) imposes no liability unless the landowner “should expect that [the 
plaintiff] will not discover the danger.” Id. § 343(b). 
 126. See Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 919 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996). The plaintiff in Lawrence did not plead section 343.  
 127. Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 128. Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993). 
 129. Gillespie, 937 S.W.2d at 377. 
 130. The plaintiff in Halmick was engaged in the construction and remodeling of an airport 
hangar. 832 S.W.2d 926, 926. The plaintiff in Matteuzzi was replacing the roof of a row house 
that was undergoing extensive renovation. 866 S.W.2d 128, 132. The Gillespie court also 
follows Lawrence in using the word “construction” in its discussion without noting its 
significance. 937 S.W.2d at 377. 
 131. 937 S.W.2d at 378-79. 
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claims when it eliminated the direct negligence version of the 
inherently dangerous activity doctrine.132 If, as these assertions 
maintain, the Missouri Supreme Court deems the same analysis 
applicable to both the doctrine and section 343 premises liability, it 
follows that Zueck’s reasons for eliminating vicarious landowner 
liability under the doctrine are equally persuasive to reject a claim 
under section 343.133 As discussed in section VII, this is not the case.  
As in Lawrence, the court’s strained reading of the Zueck and 
Matteuzzi decisions produced the proper result. The plaintiff argued 
that insulation and dust made two slim parallel beams look like one 
big one, thus creating a dangerous condition.134 As a professional 
installer of computer cable,135 however, the plaintiff surely knew the 
dangers involved in the work. The danger was not unreasonable, as 
section 343 requires for liability.136 Further, although he had access to 
an extension ladder and a safety belt, the plaintiff declined to use 
either safety device.137 This lack of precaution is not something that 
the landowner should have expected, which is another requirement 
for section 343 liability.138 The result would therefore be the same 
had the court allowed a section 343 claim.  
C. Callahan v. Alumax Foils, Inc. 
In Callahan, as in Gillespie, the court held that the control-of-the-
work test governs all negligence claims by employees of independent 
contractors against landowners.139 Almost immediately after stating 
the facts of the case, the court announced that the plaintiff could not 
 
 132. Id. at 378. 
 133. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. As the court noted in Matteuzzi, “the 
same reasons set forth in Zueck for rejecting a claim under [the indirect liability form of the 
inherently dangerous activity doctrine] are equally persuasive to reject a claim under [the direct 
liability form of the doctrine].” 866 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. 1993). From this, the Gillespie court 
inferred that Zueck and Matteuzzi intended to eliminate all forms of direct landowner liability to 
employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation. 937 S.W.2d at 378. 
 134. 937 S.W. 2d at 374-75.  
 135. In fact, he was the crew chief. Id. at 374.  
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(a) (1965).  
 137. 937 S.W.2d at 374. 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(b) (1965). 
 139. 973 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
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proceed under section 343.140 It held that the plaintiff’s only option 
was to demonstrate the requisite landowner control under the control-
of-the-work test.141 The court admitted that the plaintiff would have 
avoided summary judgment if he had been able to proceed under a 
theory that the defendant was negligent for failing to warn of a 
dangerous condition on its property.142 Following Gillespie, however, 
the court indicated that Matteuzzi precluded the use of such a 
theory.143 Accordingly, because the plaintiff worked at his own 
direction, the landowner escaped liability.144  
In neither Lawrence nor Gillespie did the court’s errant analysis 
likely affect the success of the plaintiff’s claims. By contrast, 
Callahan demonstrates the danger in the prevailing interpretation of 
Matteuzzi. In order to assign liability for an injury that was unrelated 
to the plaintiff’s work,145 the Callahan court applied a test that 
measures the landowner’s control over that work. In such a situation, 
the control-of-the-work test does not reflect reality; it cannot 
determine factual control of the situation. Unlike Lawrence and 
Gillespie, the plaintiff was in no position to avoid his injury. Nothing 
about his training as a pipe fitter had prepared him for the danger 
posed by carbon monoxide fumes emitted by a source unrelated to his 
work. The landowner, on the other hand, should have periodically 
inspected the pipes in its own manufacturing plant, especially pipes 
 
 140. Id. Perhaps due to the precedents set in Lawrence and Gillespie, the court makes 
relatively few justifications for its holding. Some of the court’s declarations seem rather hasty. 
The following is an example: 
Matteuzzi explicitly holds that a plaintiff who is covered by his employer’s workers’ 
compensation insurance cannot bring a cause of action against the landowner under 
section 413 of the Restatement. Thus, whether or not the dangerous condition existed 
before plaintiff began working on defendant’s property is not relevant to our analysis.  
Id. at 491 (citation omitted). Section 413 presents the requirements for direct negligence under 
the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965). 
There are no references to the condition of the premises in this section. Dangerous conditions, 
on the other hand, are addressed in section 343. Id. § 343. The court makes no effort to explain 
why the demise of a theory that is based solely on the nature of the work results in the 
elimination of a second theory, which is based solely on the condition of the premises. See 
supra notes 77 and 35 for the text of sections 413 and 343, respectively. 
 141. 973 S.W.2d at 490. 
 142. Id. at 491. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 491-92. 
 145. See supra note 111. 
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that it knew to contain deadly carbon monoxide.   
Furthermore, from a deterrence perspective, the Callahan ruling 
gives companies such as the defendant no incentive to inspect their 
facilities to ensure a safe working environment for employees of 
independent contractors. The scenario presented in Callahan is likely 
to repeat itself unless landowners have an incentive to act with 
reasonable care. When a cause of action is routinely denied in such 
cases, plaintiffs are powerless to protect themselves.  
VI. A BETTER INTERPRETATION OF MATTEUZZI 
To properly understand Matteuzzi, it is important to recognize that 
(1) the Missouri Supreme Court analyzed two distinct causes of 
action: one under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine and 
another under section 343 premises liability, and (2) the court made 
its statements regarding the control-of-the-work test in the context of 
construction work. 
First, the court addressed the inherently dangerous activity 
doctrine. The court noted that the doctrine has two variations. The 
first variation is a cause of action for the landowner’s direct 
negligence in failing to take proper precautions.146 The alternate 
variation holds the landowner vicariously liable for the contractor’s 
negligence in failing to take proper precautions.147 The court ruled 
that neither variation is available to employees of independent 
contractors who are covered by workers’ compensation.148 
Thus far, there are two possible indications that the court meant to 
include section 343’s theory of landowner liability in its abrogation 
of the direct negligence version of the inherently dangerous activity 
doctrine. First, at the beginning of its discussion of the doctrine’s 
common law origins, the court refers to the doctrine as “a species of 
premises liability.”149 In this context, the court’s statement is merely a 
reference to the doctrine’s original purpose, which was to protect 
neighbors from dangerous activities performed on a landowner’s 
 
 146. Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128, 130-31 (Mo. 1993).  
 147.  Id. 
 148. Id. at 132. 
 149. Id. at 130. 
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property.150  
The second possible indication that the court meant to treat the 
doctrine and premises liability equally is the court’s quotation of 
Halmick151 to the effect that the inherently dangerous activity/non-
inherently dangerous activity distinction is no longer valid.152 
Appellate courts have construed this language to mean that the 
control-of-the-work test applies to all negligence theories.153 Clearly, 
this interpretation reads too much into the short passage. It is far 
likelier that the court meant only that plaintiffs cannot avoid the 
control-of-the-work test by invoking the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine.154  
Regardless of the court’s intent in invoking Halmick, there is no 
escaping the fact that Matteuzzi sanctioned the use of the control-of-
the-work test only in situations involving construction work. 
Following its discussion of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, 
 
 150. In Bower v. Peate, the case that announced the doctrine, the court opines that the 
general rule “cannot prevail” where a landowner: 
directs an act to be done from which injurious consequences will result unless means 
are taken to prevent them in the shape of additional work, but omits to direct the latter 
to be done as part of the work to be executed, contenting himself with securing to 
himself a pecuniary indemnity in the event of any claim arising from damage to the 
adjoining property.  
1 Q.B.D. 321, 326 (1876) (emphasis added). The same court further said that a landowner: 
who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, 
injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless means are 
adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of 
that which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his 
responsibility by employing someone else . . . to do what is necessary to prevent the 
act he has ordered to be done from becoming wrongful.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, 832 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 152. 866 S.W.2d at 131. “Halmick properly states that ‘. . . the inherently dangerous 
activity/non-inherently dangerous activity dichotomy is abolished in cases where the employee 
of an independent contractor is injured and is covered by workers’ compensation . . . .’” Id. 
(quoting Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 928). 
 153. See, e.g., Gillespie v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 937 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996).  
 154. The appellate courts have taken the Halmick reference out of context. The sentence 
immediately preceding the Halmick quote characterizes Halmick as having recognized that both 
sections 413 and 416 are eliminated. 866 S.W.2d at 131. The sentences following the quote are 
also about the two versions of the doctrine. Id. Indeed, this entire section of the opinion speaks 
solely of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. 
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the court announced a transition to a discussion of the landowner’s 
duty to provide a safe workplace.155 The court’s repeated use of the 
term “construction” during this discussion leaves little doubt that the 
court meant to confine the control-of-the-work test to construction 
work liability.156  
As the court implies, construction cases are unique because the 
landowner usually must vacate the premises while the work is being 
performed. In such situations, the landowner has no factual control of 
the premises.157 With this loss of control, there is a corresponding 
loss of liability.  
In contrast, landowners often retain factual control of the premises 
in non-construction situations.158 Post-Matteuzzi appellate court 
decisions have overlooked this preliminary question of premises 
control. Only once it is established that the landowner relinquished 
control of the premises is the control-of-the-work test properly 
applied.  
In summary, a logically sound reading of Matteuzzi reveals that 
the court did indeed virtually eliminate the inherently dangerous 
activity doctrine. However, it did not include premises liability 
claims in that action. Most importantly, the court intended to confine 
the control-of-the-work test to the construction work context. 
 
 155. Id. at 131, 132. “Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we must 
determine if the allegations in Matteuzzi’s petition support, in the alternative, a cause of action 
under a different theory of premises liability. In that regard, Matteuzzi claims that the 
landowner had a duty to make the jobsite safe whether or not the construction involved an 
inherently dangerous activity.” Id. at 132. 
 156. This discussion spans four paragraphs, in which the word “construction” appears four 
times. Id. 
 157. See Id. The court states: 
It is well-settled that a property owner owes an invitee the duty to use reasonable and 
ordinary care to prevent injury to the invitee, and that an employee of an independent 
contractor who has permission to use a landowner’s premises or facilities is such an 
invitee. If, however, the landowner relinquishes possession and control of the premises 
to an independent contractor during a period of construction, the duty of care shifts to 
the independent contractor. 
Id. (citations omitted). “Factual control” is what the Hunt court originally sought to determine 
with the control-of-the-work test. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
 158. See supra note 114.  
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VII. THE ONLY INTERPRETATION THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH ZUECK 
As noted above,159 the appellate court in Gillespie maintained that 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s analyses in Zueck and Matteuzzi 
pertain to premises liability claims as defined in section 343 of the 
Restatement. If Gillespie is correct, then Zueck’s seven justifications 
for partially abrogating the inherently dangerous activity doctrine 
should be equally persuasive to reject a premises liability claim. 
The first justification is that the employee’s workers’ 
compensation coverage eliminates the need for landowner liability. 
This theory’s application to inherently dangerous activity claims has 
some merit. The landowner is typically not at fault, so the employee’s 
workers’ compensation limitation operates the way it was intended—
to limit the employer’s liability.160 From the premises liability 
perspective, however, there is a competing policy concern that 
militates against eliminating landowner liability: that imposing 
premises liability on the landowner would lessen the risk of injury by 
requiring the landowner to show reasonable care with regard to 
known or reasonably known dangers on the premises. As the 
Callahan case illustrates, without premises liability, landowners have 
no incentive to act with reasonable care,161 which increases the risk of 
injury to workers. The positive effects of premises liability, and the 
negative effects of eliminating it, cumulatively outweigh workers’ 
compensation’s concern with limiting employer liability. 
Second, the Zueck court held that it is unfair to place some of the 
workers’ compensation burden on the landowner through a higher 
contract price while exposing it to tort liability as well.162 This 
justification is suspect as applied to either theory. Members of society 
incur this type of “double liability” in many situations.163 The added 
 
 159. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.  
 160. See Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. 1991) 
(explaining the quid pro quo nature of the workers’ compensation system). 
 161. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
 162. 809 S.W.2d at 388-89. 
 163. When someone rents a car, for example, the cost of the rental company’s liability 
insurance is factored into the rental price. This fact does not shield the driver from liability for 
his negligent operation of the vehicle. In Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., the dissenting judge 
offered the following hypothetical: “What if a truck driver of one of Regulus’s major customers 
ran down a Regulus employee? Should the fact that the price of the stud includes, at least in 
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cost resulting from workers’ compensation coverage is a normal cost 
of doing business.164  
The third justification is that the doctrine defeats the tort policy 
goal of placing the burden of liability on the party who can best avoid 
the harm.165 Because the contractor presumably has experience 
performing the particular dangerous activity, this justification clearly 
applies to the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. With premises 
liability, however, it does not stand. A contractor, no matter how 
experienced, can do little to avoid the harm posed by hidden dangers. 
The key to avoiding the harm in premises liability is knowledge of 
the dangerous condition. The landowner is far more likely to have 
such knowledge than is the contractor. This particular justification for 
eliminating the inherently dangerous activity doctrine therefore has 
no bearing on premises liability claims. 
The fourth justification is that liability under the doctrine 
encourages the landowner to negligently utilize its own employees to 
do the work that skilled independent contractors are far better 
equipped to handle, thus increasing the risk of injury to workers.166 
This justification’s applicability to the doctrine is self-explanatory. 
Much like the third justification, however, it provides little rationale 
for eliminating premises liability claims. By hiring a contractor when 
premises liability applies, the landowner assumes risk only to the 
extent that it (a) knows or reasonably should know of a dangerous 
condition and appreciates the danger it poses to invitees, and (b) 
should expect the invitees to either fail to detect the danger or fail to 
protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to alert the invitees to the 
condition. The risk, in other words, is far from unduly burdensome.  
The fifth justification, that the doctrine increases risk to innocent 
third parties,167 does not apply to premises liability. Requiring 
landowners to notify invitees of dangerous conditions will in no way 
endanger innocent third parties. 
 
part, the cost of workmen’s compensation premiums shield that customer from tort liability?” 
744 P.2d 102, 113 (Idaho 1987) (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
 164. The court makes the same statement in Zueck, but oddly regards it as an argument 
against imposing landowner liability. 809 S.W.2d at 389. 
 165. Id. at 387-88. 
 166. Id. at 388. 
 167. Id. 
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The sixth justification is that the doctrine defeats the tort policy 
goal of placing the loss upon the party who is at fault. Again, the only 
party who could be at fault under premises liability is the landowner. 
If, for some reason, the landowner failed to warn invitees of a 
dangerous condition, then a premises liability cause of action would 
serve the same goal that the doctrine defeats. 
The Zueck court’s final justification for eliminating the doctrine is 
that a negligent contractor’s workers’ compensation immunity 
precludes the landowner from recovering from him after being sued 
by one of the contractor’s employees. This justification is suspect as 
applied to the doctrine.168 When applied to premises liability claims, 
it makes no sense. If there is a negligent party in a premises liability 
claim, it will be the landowner. Therefore, the right to indemnity 
would be useless to the landowner under premises liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The Missouri Supreme Court should affirmatively and clearly 
reinstate premises liability claims under section 343 of the 
Restatement for employees of independent contractors. Not only is 
the prevailing interpretation of Matteuzzi at odds with the language of 
the opinion; it is completely unresponsive to reality. As the court 
wisely stated in Zueck, “[Tort] rules ought to function to promote 
care and punish neglect by placing the burden of their breach on the 
person who can best avoid the harm. When a rule of tort liability 
encourages a result contrary to these policy goals, it ought to be 
abandoned.”169 
 
 168. For criticism of the court’s reasoning on this issue, see Burt, supra note 9, at 89-90, 
noting that landowners can ensure indemnification by specifying the right in the work contract 
(citing McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 796 
(Mo. 1959)).  
 169. 809 S.W.2d at 388. 
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